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In this paper we study the determinants of business groups' ownership structure using unique panel
data on Korean chaebols. In particular, we attempt to understand how pyramids form over time. We
find that chaebols grow vertically (that is, pyramidally) as the family uses well-established group firms
("central firms") to set up and acquire younger firms that have low profitability and high capital requirements.
Chaebols grow horizontally (that is, using direct family ownership) when the family acquires firms
that are highly profitable and require less capital. Our evidence suggests that the (previously documented)
lower profitability of pyramidal firms is partly due to a selection effect (e.g., the family optimally places
low profitability firms in pyramids). To show this, we examine instances of large changes in the ownership
structure of group firms. Specifically, we find that poor past performance predicts an increase in the
degree of pyramiding in a firm's ownership structure. Most compellingly, we find that the profitability
of new group firms in the year before they are added to the group predicts whether they are added
to pyramids or controlled directly by the family. We also examine the relative valuation of chaebol
firms. We find that the group's central firms trade at a discount relative to other public group firms
possibly due to the selection of low-profitability, high capital intensity firms into pyramids. Our results
shed light on the process by which pyramids form, and provide new evidence on the performance and
valuation of business group firms.
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Groups of firms under common ownership are prevalent around the world. These so-called
business groups account for a large fraction of the economic activity of many countries.1 Most
of these groups are controlled by families that hold equity stakes in group firms either directly
or indirectly through other firms in the group. For example, one typical ownership structure
is referred to as a pyramid. In this structure, the family achieves control of the constituent
firms by a chain of ownership relations: the family directly controls a firm, which in turn
controls another firm.2
The previous empirical literature has generally taken group structure as given, and stud-
ied the consequences induced by its ownership structure. The literature focuses mostly on
the relationship between the controlling family’s cash flow and voting rights and measures
of accounting performance and valuation (see, e.g., Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, and
Faccio and Lang, 2002). However, the reasons that determine a group’s ownership structure
remain largely unexplored. In particular, while there have been some recent theoretical at-
tempts to understand pyramidal ownership, there is little empirical research that focuses on
how pyramids form over time.3 We try to fill this gap in this paper.
Our tests drawmostly on Almeida andWolfenzon’s (2006) theory of pyramidal ownership.
The key predictions of that theory refer to the characteristics of new firms that are placed
by the family in pyramids. First, the higher the expected profitability of the new firm,
the more likely it is that the family will control it directly, rather than create a pyramid.
Direct ownership allows the family to avoid having to share the cash benefits of the new firm
with shareholders of an existing group firm, which would have been the case had the family
chosen to create a pyramid. There is also a financing advantage for the family in placing
lower profitability firms in pyramids. To wit, the pyramidal structure allows the family to
use the equity of existing group firms to invest in new firms. Group equity is particularly
valuable when the family finds it harder to finance the new firm with external capital, for
example if the new firm has low profitability. In addition, and for related reasons, the theory
also predicts that firms that require larger capital expenditures should be placed in pyramids.
Accordingly, our empirical tests examine the profitability and capital intensity of pyramidal
firms, and compare them with firms that the family chooses to own directly.
The theory also makes two other predictions that we examine with our data. First, the
theory suggests that firms owned through pyramids should be younger than other group
firms (because the family uses existing group firms to set up and control new firms through
pyramids).4 Second, the theory predicts that firms that are used by the family to set up
1Claessens, Fan, and Lang (2002) find that, in eight out of the nine Asian countries they study, the top
15 family groups control more that 20% of the listed corporate assets. In a sample of 13 Western European
countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) find that, in nine countries, the top 15 family groups control more than
20% of the listed corporate assets.
2Pyramids are very common throughout the world. See, among others, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
(2000), for the evidence on East Asia, Faccio and Lang (2002) and Barca and Becht (2001) for Western
Europe, Khanna (2000) for emerging markets, and Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000) for Canada.
3A recent paper by Fan, Wong and Zhang (2009) focuses on the formation of state-owned pyramids in
China. As discussed by those authors, state-owned Chinese firms are special in that they show no separation
between ownership and control. Bertrand et al (2004) use cross-sectional data on Thai business groups to
study the role of family structure for group ownership structure and group firm performance. In particular,
they find that groups that are controlled by larger families are more pyramidal in structure.
4As we discuss in Section 2, this implication is not trivial. For example, an alternative story is that
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and acquire other firms (firms that we call central firms) should trade at a discount relative
to other public group firms. This is because the firms that the family decides to set up in
a pyramid are the low profitability ones. The valuation discount arises because investors
anticipate these low return investments by central firms.
We use a unique dataset of Korean business groups to test the theory’s implications. The
political and regulatory context of chaebols allows us to obtain extremely detailed ownership
data on chaebol firms. Since the mid-1990s, the top Korean chaebols have had to report
their complete ownership information to the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). These
reports include ownership and accounting data on all firms (public or private) in each chaebol.
Another feature that distinguishes our data is its dynamic nature. We have a panel from
1998 to 2004, for a relatively comprehensive sample of chaebol firms. In most countries,
these type of data are not generally available.5
The theoretical arguments above motivate new metrics of group ownership other than
the standard measures of cash flow and voting rights. First, we provide a measure of the
position of any group firm relative to the controlling shareholder. This metric allows us to
distinguish pyramidal from direct ownership. In addition, to identify firms that the family
uses to set up new firms, we compute the centrality of a firm for the group structure (e.g.,
whether a given firm is used by the family to control other group firms).6 We also introduce
a new metric to compute voting rights that we call critical control threshold. As we argue
in the paper, the weakest link, the most common measure to compute voting rights, does
not work well for groups with complex ownership structures. Our proposed measure can be
seen as being closely related to the concept of weakest link and is easy to compute for any
possible group structure. We provide algorithms that can generate these ownership measures
for group structures of any degree of complexity. In our data, this is necessary because the
complex ownership structures of Korean business groups (chaebols) with dozens of firms and
several ownership links among them makes it diﬃcult for the researcher to directly compute
them.7
We start by describing the basic characteristics of Korean chaebols. We find that both
pyramids and cross-shareholdings are common in Korean chaebols. Nevertheless, pyramids
in Korean chaebols are not “deep”. A large majority of chaebol firms belong to pyramids
with a total of two or three firms in the chain. Only a few group firms in each group are
classified as being central, and they tend to be the older and larger firms in the group.
These findings suggest that in a typical Korean chaebol, a small number of central firms hold
stakes in a large number of firms controlled through a pyramid involving the central firms.
We also observe a substantial number of firms that are controlled directly by the family,
with no ownership links to other chaebol firms. This cross-sectional variation in chaebol firm
ownership structures allows us to test the predictions described above.
pyramids arise as the family sets up firms with direct ownership, and uses them to acquire equity stakes in
existing (e.g., older) group firms.
5Franks et al. (2008) assemble a dataset that contains ownership information on private firms in France,
Germany, Italy and the UK. They focus on the trade-oﬀ between family and dispersed ownership, rather
than on the ownership structure of groups.
6The measure of centrality that we derive is similar (but not identical) to that proposed by Kim and
Sung (2006).
7Our algorithms can also be useful in other countries with complex ownership structures, such as India.
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The empirical evidence on the characteristics of group firms is largely consistent with the
theoretical implications derived above. First, we find that firms owned through pyramids
are younger than firms that are at the top of the group. Second, we find that firms that are
placed at the bottom of the group (that is, that are controlled through pyramids) have lower
profitability and higher capital expenditures than firms that the family chooses to place at the
top of the group. Third, we find a robust negative correlation between centrality and market-
to-book ratios (Tobin’s Q). This valuation discount is consistent with the prediction that
minority shareholders of the central firms “price in” the expected eﬀect of value-destroying
pyramidal investments.
A major challenge for our empirical tests is to distinguish our implications from the
traditional argument that pyramidal ownership reduces firm performance (see, e.g., Claessens
et al., 2002, and Joh, 2003), perhaps because of tunnelling incentives created by pyramiding
(Bertrand, Mehta and Mullanaithan, 2002, Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002, Baek, Kang and
Lee, 2006). To wit, a negative correlation between profitability and pyramidal ownership
is consistent both with the selection story in Almeida and Wolfenzon, and also with the
tunneling argument (which predicts that the family will tunnel profits away from pyramidal
firms and towards firms in which it has higher cash flow ownership).
To show that the selection story is at work in the data, we perform several complementary
tests. Our baseline empirical specification involves regressing a measure of the position of the
firm in the group structure on its lagged profitability, while controlling for other variables that
might explain the firm’s position in the group such as firm age and size. First, we compute
correlations between past profitability and position, separately for central and non-central
firms. The selection story focuses on the choice of position for new non-central firms that are
added to the group. In contrast, the tunneling argument should apply for both central and
non-central firms. Second, we also include current profitability among the controls in some
specifications. To the extent that profitability predicts position, the correlation between
profitability and position should be stronger for lagged profitability. Third, we experiment
with instances of large changes in a firm’s position in the group. Examining large changes
in position is useful because it allows us to rule out alternative explanations that rely on the
fact that position does not change much over time.8 In particular, we examine whether low
(high) past profitability predicts an increase (decrease) in the degree of pyramiding in a firm’s
ownership structure. Finally, we examine a sample of new firms that are added to chaebols
in the time period of our sample, and study the determinants of their ownership structure.
A firm’s profitability in the year prior to becoming a chaebol firm cannot be aﬀected by the
ownership structure chosen later by the chaebol ’s controlling family. However, pre-chaebol
profitability should explain the firm’s ownership structure, according to the selection story.
Our results are consistent with the selection story. First, the correlation between past
profitability and a firm’s position in the chaebol is negative for non-central firms, but positive
and insignificant for central firms. Second, the correlation is negative and significant for
lagged profitability, but insignificant for current profitability. Third, poor past performance
predicts an increase in the extent of pyramidal ownership in a firm’s ownership structure.
Finally, pre-chaebol profitability is strongly related to a firm’s initial position in the group,
8For example, lagged profitability could be caused by the firm’s lagged position, which happens to be the
same as the current one.
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in a way that is consistent with theory - incoming low profitability firms are more likely to be
placed lower down in pyramids. We note that these results do not rule out the possibility that
the family tunnels cash flows out of firms that it decides to place in pyramids. The empirical
tests are designed to identify the selection story, and not to provide direct evidence on the
alternative tunneling story. For example, the fact that pre-chaebol profitability predicts the
firm’s first position in the group does not preclude the possibility that the family will tunnel
cash flows away from pyramidal firms after they are placed in the group. However, our
results do suggest that part of the correlation between pyramids and profitability that is
documented in previous literature is likely to be due to reverse causality.
Overall, we believe that our paper contributes to the literature on business groups in four
ways. Most importantly, our results shed new light on the process by which pyramids form.
In addition, we present new results on the performance and valuation of business group firms.
In particular, the central firm valuation discount is new to the literature. Third, we develop
new metrics of group ownership structure (e.g., position, centrality and the critical control
threshold) that can be useful for other researchers studying complex ownership structures
in Korea and in other countries. Fourth, we use our metrics to describe and summarize the
typical structure of a Korean chaebol. To our knowledge, this description is also new to the
literature on Korean groups.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a brief review of the literature
on the financial performance of family groups. Section 2 develops the empirical implications
that we test in this paper. Section 3 introduces our methodology to compute ownership
variables for group firms. In Section 4 we describe our dataset. Section 5 presents our main
empirical tests, and Section 6 concludes.
1 Literature review
There is a vast literature on family business groups.9 In this section, we discuss briefly the
part of the literature that links ownership structure to financial performance.
The existing literature points out that the ownership structure of business groups is a
potential determinant of group firm performance and valuation.10 Most papers use cash flows
and voting rights as the main metrics to describe group structure. For example, Bertrand,
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) use a sample of Indian business groups to show that the
value of group firms is aﬀected by the controlling families’ tunnelling of resources from firms
in which they have low cash flow rights to firms in which their ultimate stake is high.11 In
the context of Korean chaebols, Baek, Kang and Lee (2006) argue that discounted equity
9For a detailed review, see Morck et al. (2005).
10This does not mean that ownership is the only dimension of group structure that is interesting. Khanna
and Thomas (2005), for example, show that stock price comovement in Chilean firms is greater when directors
overlap than when firms belong to the same pyramid. Bertrand et al. (2004) link group structure to
the history of the familes of controlling shareholders. Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2008) study IPO
underpricing of stand-alone and group firms. See also Khanna (2000), and the survey by Khanna and Yafeh
(2007).
11In contrast, Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2006) examine intra-group loans in Indian business groups, and
find little evidence of tunneling. They suggest that loans are used to support financially weaker firms in the
group.
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issues are more likely when the controlling shareholder has higher ultimate ownership in the
acquirer than in the issuer. Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) argue that intra-chaebol acquisitions
transfer wealth from firms in which the family has low cash flow rights (typically the acquirer)
to those in which the family has higher cash flow rights.12 Claessens et al. (2002) show that
firm value is negatively related to the separation between ownership and control in East
Asia, while Lins (2003) finds similar results for a sample of firms from the emerging markets.
Joh (2003) finds that the separation between ownership and control is negatively related to
profitability in Korea.13
Instead of focusing on measures of cash flow and voting rights, other papers examine
variables that indicate whether a firm has some indirect (e.g., pyramidal) ownership. In
particular, Claessens et al. (2002) and Volpin (2002) provide evidence that firms with indirect
ownership have lower Tobin’s Q than other firms. In contrast, Masulis, Pham, and Zein
(2008) find that Tobin’s Q is higher in pyramidal firms than in firms at the top of the group.
The literature has also examined whether group membership aﬀect valuation (Khanna
and Rivkin (2001), Khanna and Palepu (2000), Fisman and Khanna (2000), and Claessens,
Fan and Lang (2002)). Khanna and Palepu (2000), for example, find a positive eﬀect of
group membership in their sample from India. Baek, Kang and Park (2004) focus on the
eﬀects of Asian crisis on Korean firms, and show evidence for a stronger impact of the crisis
on chaebol firms. In a cross-country study, Masulis et al. (2008) find that, after controlling
for group membership choice, groups help improve firm value.
Finally, the literature provides some evidence on the correlation between ownership vari-
ables and firm characteristics. In particular, there is evidence that firms that are owned
through pyramids are smaller and younger than firms at the top of the group (those that
own shares in other firms). Aganin and Volpin (2005) describe the evolution of the Pesenti
group in Italy, and show that it was created by adding new subsidiaries to the firms the
Pesenti family already owned, through carve-outs of existing group firms. One of their con-
clusions is that, in Italy, business groups expand through acquisitions when they are large
and have significant cash resources. Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002) find that firms with
the highest separation of votes and ownership (i.e., those most likely to be owned through
pyramids) are younger than those with less separation. Pyramidal firms also seem to be
associated with larger scales of capital investment (Attig, Fischer, and Gadhoum (2003)).
Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002) also find that, in East Asia, group firms tend to be larger
than unaﬃliated firms. Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques (2001) find similar evidence for Italy.14
12In a related fashion, Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) find that connected transactions between Hong
Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders (such as transfer of assets across firms under the
shareholder’s control) result in value losses for minority shareholders. Their sample includes both group and
non-group firms.
13Bennedsen and Nielsen (2006) find that valuation is negatively related to the separation between own-
ership and control in Continental Europe, but also that profitability is unrelated to measures of separation
in the same region.
14Kang, Park and Jang (2006a) also analyze the family’s choice of ownership structure in chaebols. How-
ever, they focus on average ownership characteristics of the entire group rather than on characteristics of
individual chaebol firms.
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2 Hypotheses regarding the formation of pyramids
The traditional informal explanation for pyramidal structures is based on the idea that fam-
ilies try to control as many firms as possible to enjoy private benefits of control. Pyramidal
structures lead to a separation of cash flow from voting rights that allow these families to
minimize their ultimate cash flow stake in the firms they control (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Kraak-
man and Triantis, 2000).15 According to this argument, pyramidal structures are only a
device to achieve the desired separation of cash flow from control rights. As discussed by
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), while pyramids are generally associated with large devia-
tions from “one share-one vote”, this pattern is not universal (see, e.g., Franks and Mayer,
2001). In addition, despite the fact that the family can also use dual class shares to separate
ownership from control, the incidence of pyramids in diﬀerent countries does not appear to
be caused by restrictions on the use of dual-class shares (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 1999). This evidence suggests that considerations other than the separation of cash
flow from voting rights motivate the creation of pyramids.
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) present a model of pyramidal ownership that does not
rely on separation between ownership and control. Similar to the traditional story, their
model is based on the assumption that families can extract private benefits from the firms
they control at the expense of minority shareholders. In the model, a family has the choice
of setting up a new firm (call it firm B) either through a pyramid (that is, using an existing
group firm to buy a controlling equity stake in the new firm) or directly (that is, buying the
equity stake directly with the family’s personal wealth). Under the pyramidal structure, firm
B is owned by all the shareholders of the original firm (call it firm A). As a result, the family
shares the cash benefits (but not the private benefits) of firm B with nonfamily shareholders
of firm A. In addition, the family has access to all of the retained earnings (cash) of firm
A to acquire equity stakes in firm B. Under direct ownership, nonfamily shareholders of
firm A have no rights to the cash flows of firm B, and thus, the family captures all of its
cash benefits. However, in this case, the family has access only to its share of the retained
earnings in the original firm (for example, through dividend payments).
This argument generates a number of testable hypothesis. For example, firms with low
investment requirements and/or high profitability are less likely to be set up in pyramids.
External financing is less important for such firms, and thus, the ability to use the cash
retained in firm A is less valuable for the family. In addition, high profitability firms generate
higher cash benefits for minority shareholders, and hence, the family is more likely to choose
a direct ownership structure for firm B to avoid sharing these benefits with the minority
shareholders of firm A. Conversely, the family is more likely to select pyramidal ownership
when firm B has low profitability and high investment requirements. For such firms, using
the cash retained in firm A through an equity investment in firm B is beneficial for the
family.16
15This argument goes back at least to the beginning of the 20th century: Berle and Means (1932) and
Graham and Dodd (1934) use this argument to explain the creation of pyramids in the U.S. in the early
20th century.
16Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) develop a theory of dividends in business groups that uses arguments
that resemble those in Almeida andWolfenzon (2006). In particular, they show how families can use dividends
as a way of transferring cash across group firms to finance group investments. Their focus is on explaining
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In the theory, these arguments are valid irrespective of the degree of separation between
family ownership and control in firmB.While we would expect firms owned through pyramids
to show (on average) higher separation between ownership and control than firms owned
directly by the family, the financing advantage of using a pyramid to control firm B is
independent of the deviation between cash flow and voting rights in firm B.17 This is in
contrast to the traditional arguments for pyramids which rely on the fact that pyramids
exist to separate ownership from control.
The model also generates implications about the valuation of pyramidal investments by
the shareholders of firm A. Since the family places low profitability, high private benefit firms
in pyramids, minority shareholders of firm A should not expect high returns from pyramidal
investments. For example, an unanticipated announcement of a pyramidal investment of
significant size should generate a negative return for the shareholders of firm A. In addition,
if shareholders anticipate significant future pyramidal investments by firm A, then they
should discount the shares of firm A accordingly, to compensate for the expected eﬀects of
future pyramidal investments on its equity returns.
Finally, the model generates implications about the timing of pyramid creation. In the
model, a pyramidal structure allows the family to use firm A’s financial capacity to reduce
the financing costs of setting up firm B. This argument implies that pyramids are created
over time. As existing family firms build internal resources, it becomes more likely that they
will be used to acquire new firms through pyramidal stakes. In other words, we expect firms
that hold large equity stakes in other group firms (those that are like firm A in the model)
to be older than the firms at the bottom of the pyramid (those that are like firm B).
We summarize this discussion with a list of the implications about the structure of busi-
ness groups, which can be tested with our data on Korean chaebols:
Implication 1 Group firms that are used by the family to set up and acquire new group
firms are older than firms at the bottom of the group.
Implication 2 When adding a new firm to the group, the controlling family places firms
with low expected profitability in pyramids and directly controls firms with high ex-
pected profitability.
Implication 3 Group firms that are owned through pyramids are more capital intensive
than group firms that are owned directly by the family.
Implication 4 Public group firms that are used by the family to set up and acquire new
group firms should have lower valuations than public group firms that are not used to
set up and acquire new group firms.
Implication 1 might seem trivial, but one can imagine situations in which it does not hold.
The family can set up a new firm with direct family ownership, and use its equity to buy
stakes in other group firms (thus placing it at the top of a pyramid). Also, controlling families
group dividend policy rather than ownership structure.
17In fact, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) show that this financing advantage exists even when the family
can issue unlimited dual-class shares to set up firm B.
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sometimes set up shell companies to acquire stakes in other group firms in a tax-eﬃcient
manner. In these cases we would see younger firms at the top of pyramids.
Implication 2 is consistent with a negative correlation between pyramidal ownership and
profitability. In fact, previous papers find strong evidence on this correlation (see Section 1).
However, the interpretation so far has been that this association is evidence that pyramids
reduce profitability because they induce tunneling behavior by the family (Bertrand, Mehta
and Mullanaithan, 2002, Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002, Baek, Kang and Lee, 2006). In contrast,
in our argument the correlation is driven by the opposite direction of causality: lower prof-
itability firms are selected into pyramids. We provide a battery of empirical tests to provide
evidence on the direction of causality suggested by implication 2. It is important to note,
however, that the empirical tests that we provide are not designed to prove or disprove the
tunneling argument. In addition, we note that Implication 2 and the tunneling argument
are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in Almeida and Wolfenzon’s (2006) model, the family
will ex-post divert more cash flows from firms that it decides to place in pyramids ex-ante
(because its ultimate ownership stake in that firm is lower).
Regarding Implication 4, previous empirical studies focus on the relation between a firm’s
valuation and its own ownership structure. In contrast, Implication 4 focuses on the role the
firm plays in the group. This implication is new to the literature on groups. The central
firm valuation discount also bears some resemblance to other empirical findings in the finance
literature including the “closed-end fund puzzle” (see, e.g., Shleifer, 2000) and the “parent
company discount” (see, e.g., Cornell and Liu, 2001). We discuss the relationship between
our findings and these previous findings after we present the empirical results (in Section
5.3.1).
3 Metrics of group ownership structures
In order to test the empirical implications described in Section 2, we develop some new
metrics of group structure. Specifically, the theory models the family’s choice of whether to
set up a new firm as a partial subsidiary of an established firm, or to hold stakes directly. To
capture this notion, we define the variable position. We also define the variable centrality to
identify firms that the controlling family uses to set up and acquire new firms. In addition,
we argue that the standard measure of voting rights (the weakest link) is diﬃcult to apply
to groups with complex ownership structures such as the Korean chaebols. We propose
an alternative measure of control in a group, the critical control threshold, and provide an
algorithm to compute it.
We provide formulae and simple algorithms to compute all the metrics we propose. This
is crucial for the case of Korea, where the web of ownership relations among group firms
can be quite complex. As an illustration of this complexity, in Figure 1, we have selected
only 11 of the 27 firms that form part of the Hyundai Motor group and drawn its ownership
structure as of 2004. Needless to say, computing ownership metrics in this group can be
a daunting task. Importantly, the formulae we propose can easily deal with any type of
ownership structure.
In Appendix A, we show a numerical example that illustrates the computation of several
of the ownership variables described here, including position, the critical control threshold,
9
and centrality.
3.1 Ultimate cash flow rights, position and loops
We start by considering a business groups with N firms. We define the matrix of inter-
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where sij is the stake of firm i in firm j. We also define a vector with the direct stakes of
the family in each of the N firms:18
f 0 =
£
f1 f2 · · · fN
¤
. (2)
The key insight to derive all formulae in this section is to follow one dollar of dividends paid
by firm i. We write the dividend as a vector of zeroes with a 1 in the ith position, d0i. The
family receives f 0di when the dividend is paid and group firms receive Adi. Now suppose
group firms pay out to shareholders what they themselves receive as dividends from other
companies, i.e., the new dividend is now Adi. The family receives an additional f 0(Adi) and
the cash in group firms out of the original dollar paid is A(Adi) = A2di. A simple pattern
emerges: After n rounds of dividends, the cash position of group firms is Andi.19
3.1.1 Ultimate cash flow rights
We can now compute the family’s ultimate cash flow right in firm i, ui, which is defined
as the fraction of the dividend originally paid by firm i that is (eventually) received by the
family:
Proposition 1 The ultimate ownership of the family in each of the n firms is given by
u = [u1 u2 ... uN ]
0:
u0 = f 0(IN −A)−1 (3)
where IN is the N ×N identity matrix.
This formula is easy to use and can accommodate any group structure, regardless of its
complexity.20 Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1989) use a diﬀerent method to derive this
formula. Essentially the formula works through the matrix of cross-shareholdings to arrive
at the ultimate ownership. This is very much in the same spirit as input-output analysis
(Leontieﬀ, 1986) where the share of an industry or sector in the aggregate economy is being
computed.
18For brevity, we refer to the controlling shareholder as the “family” in the ensuing discussion.
19This argument does not presume that dividends are actually paid. If the dollar is retained in firm i, the
formulas will tell us the fraction of the dollar that is owned by the family and the other group firms (e.g.,
the cash flow rights of the family and group firms).
20Most papers in the literature compute cash flow right by multiplying the stakes along the ownership
chain. This is correct under the assumption that no cross-shareholdings exist. Under this assumption, the
chain multiplication formula is a special case of equation 3.
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3.1.2 Position
Using the same idea, we can now compute the position of a firm in a group. We define
position as the distance between the family and a firm in the group. For example, in the
case of a simple pyramid with two firms, the firm at the top of the pyramid is in position
1 and the one at the bottom is in position 2. Since there might be multiple chains from a
particular firm to the family, we weigh each chain by its importance in terms of the cash
flows the family receives. Note that the family receives f 0di from firm i directly (position 1).
It also receives f 0Adi from firm i through chains that contain one intermediate firm (position
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0A2di
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Simplifying this expression leads to:21




f 0(IN −A)−2di (5)
where IN is the N ×N identity matrix.
3.1.3 Loops
While it is not the main focus of the empirical tests, we can also use these calculations to
check whether a firm is part of a cross-ownership pattern and to compute the number of
firms involved in this loop. Essentially, if a dividend paid by firm i eventually reappears in
firm i, then i is part of a loop. Also, the number of chains that it takes for funds to reappear
for the first time in firm i measures the number of firms in the shortest loop, which we define
as loop:
Definition 1 Let
loopi = min{n|n ≥ 1 and d0iAndi > 0}, (6)
then firm i is in a loop if and only if loopi < ∞. The number of firms in the shortest loop
firm i is involved in is given by loopi.
3.2 Control rights and centrality
The computation of control rights in a complex group is challenging because it is not clear
what fraction of the votes held by intermediate firms is ultimately controlled by the family.
The most frequently used measure in the literature is the weakest link, which is defined as
21Kang, Park and Jang (2006b) derive an alternative measure of a firm’s position in a group based on
whether a firm owns significant equity in other group firms, or whether other firms own a large fraction of
the firm’s equity. The first component of the definition creates a mechanical correlation with our centrality
variable (defined below), and so we believe our definition is more appropriate to the general case of complex
ownership structures.
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the minimum stake along the chain of control. This measure is intuitive for simple pyramids:
the controlling family must have a better grip on the control of a firm that is higher up in
the pyramid than over a firm lower down that is controlled via the initial one. Yet, this
measure has some drawbacks. First, when there are multiple chains used to control a firm,
the definition calls for adding up the minimums over all chains. The intuition for this is
not as clear. Second, in groups where there are multiple chains leading to one firm, this
definition can generate numbers above 100%.22 Finally, the weakest link is not well defined
for firms that are part of loops as there are infinite chains leading to these firms.
In light of these problems, we define our own measure of control, the critical control
threshold. Essentially, the critical control threshold, or CC in short, is the maximum control
threshold for which the firm belongs to the set of firms controlled by the family. This new
definition has several appealing features. First, it can be defined for any group structure,
regardless of its complexity. Second, it is derived from clearly stated assumptions about the
characteristics of control. Finally, it turns out that this measure is equivalent to the weakest
link when cross-shareholdings and multiple links are absent (that is, for simple pyramids).23
In that sense, it is a reasonable generalization of that simple, intuitive concept.
3.2.1 The set of firms controlled by the family
To compute the set of firms controlled by the family, we make two assumptions:
Assumption 1 A family controls a firm if and only if it holds more than T votes in it,
directly or indirectly.
Assumption 2 The votes that a family holds in a firm are the sum of its direct votes, plus
all the direct votes of firms under family control, where control is defined in Assumption 1.
This definition of control is a combination of the idea of a control threshold (Assumption
1), plus the assumption that, if a family controls a firm, it controls the votes that this firm
holds in other firms.
The following proposition establishes the formal condition that the set of firms controlled
by the family must satisfy (for a given control threshold T ). Suppose we start the analysis
with a set N , which contains the universe of all candidate firms that could be controlled
by the family. For example, this set can represent all firms in a country, or a pre-identified
subset of those firms. We then have:
Proposition 3 For a given threshold T , the set of firms controlled by the family is given by:
C(T ) = {i ∈ N : fi +
X
j∈C(T ), j 6=i
sji ≥ T}. (7)
In Appendix B we describe an algorithm that can be used to find C(T ).
22Simple examples are available from the authors upon request.
23In particular, if cross-shareholdings and multiple links are absent or not very substantial the weakest
link methodology can be used to compute control rights. For example, Faccio and Lang (2002) show that
neither problem is very prevalent in Europe, justifying the use of the weakest link as a measure of control in
their sample.
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3.2.2 Critical control threshold: definition
We can now define our measure of control rights:
Definition 2 For any firm i ∈ N , the critical control threshold is given by
CCi = max{T | i ∈ C(T )} (8)
The critical control threshold is the highest control threshold that is consistent with
family control of firm i. In other words, if the control threshold were higher than CCi, then
firm i would not be part of the set of firms controlled by the family.
3.2.3 Centrality of a firm for the control of the group
In the empirical tests we need to identify group firms that the controlling family uses to set
up and control new firms. We identify such firms as those that are important for the control
of other firms. This leads to the following definition.24








]N − 1 , (9)
where CC−ij is the critical control threshold of firm j, computed as if firm i held no shares
in the other group firms.
In words, we compute the centrality of firm i as the average decrease in CC across all
group firms other than firm i, after we exclude firm i from the group. This computation
essentially determines how central a firm is, by comparing the average critical control treshold
with and without including the stakes the firm holds in other firms. This formula, as the
previous ones, can be implemented for group structure, regardless of its complexity.
In order to show that the empirical results are not driven by the control proxy that we
use, we also experiment with an alternative measure of centrality that is based only on the
direct equity stakes that each firm holds in other group firms. If we let Aj be the total assets
and Ej be the total equity of firm j, we have the following definition:






This measure is essentially the total size of the equity stake that firm i holds in other
group firms, normalized by the total assets of firm i. We normalize by the assets of firm
i because firm i’s valuation is more likely to be aﬀected when the equity stakes are large
relative to the size of firm i.
24Kim and Sung (2006) compute a similar variable for Korea, using cash flow rights instead of voting
rights. They show that their measure of centrality is inversely related to the probability that the firm goes
public. In contrast, we show below that firms with a high centrality value are much more likely to be public
in our sample.
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3.2.4 Consistent voting rights
Besides the weakest link, the previous literature has also used an alternative measure of
voting rights, namely the sum of the direct stakes held by the controlling shareholder, and
all stakes held by firms controlled by this shareholder (LaPorta et al., 1999, and Lins, 2003).25
Definition 5 Given a threshold T, the consistent voting rights of the family in firm i ∈ C(T )
are defined as:
V Ri(T ) = fi +
X
j∈C(T ), j 6=i
sji (11)
In words, to compute the sum of the votes held by the family in firm i, we simply add the
direct votes held by the family in firm i with all the votes held by other firms that belong to
C(T ). Since we only count indirect votes of firms provided that they belong to the control
set, this definition of voting rights is (internally) consistent. The V R measure is also the
measure that is used by Korean regulators to compute the separation between ownership
and control in chaebol firms.
4 Data Description
This section describes the sources for the ownership, accounting and financial data that we
use in this study.
4.1 Ownership Data
The ownership data for our study are from the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC),
which was established in 1981 with the purpose of regulating competition. In particular,
the KFTC’s stated goal is to deter excessive concentration of economic power in a small
number of large companies, including chaebols. Among other regulatory constraints, the
KFTC requires that chaebol firms report complete ownership data. Chaebols are required to
report the status of aﬃliate shareholders and persons with special interest and the financial
status of group companies as of April 1 of each year. Ownership data are recorded in detail.
Shareholders are categorized into seven types; family owner, the relatives of family owner,
aﬃliates, nonprofit aﬃliate, group oﬃcer, treasury stock, and others. In addition, our data
contain the name, the holding quantity, and the ratio of common stocks and preferred stocks
of each individual shareholder.
The KFTC’s defines a chaebol in two steps.26 In the first step, the KFTC defines the set
of firms that belong to a business group. There are two criteria for this. The first is based on
25Some researchers attribute the weakest link measure to the paper by La Porta et al. (1999), but, in
fact, they use a diﬀerent definition of voting rights which is closer to the V R measure. Specifically, they
measure indirect ownership in a firm i as the percentage of votes that other group firms hold directly in firm
i, provided that these other group firms are also controlled by the family (under control thresholds of either
10% or 20%). See Table I in p. 478 of their paper.
26To be more precise, the KFTC’s definition that we describe here is that of a large business group. A
chaebol is a large business group that is controlled by a family. Because our sample contains only family
controlled groups, we refer to chaebols and large business groups interchangeably.
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stock ownership. According to this criterion, a firm belongs to a business group if ownership
by the controlling shareholder and related persons (relatives and other aﬃliated companies
of the same business group) amounts to more than 30 per cent, excluding preferred shares.
The second criterion is qualitative. Firms are also classified as belonging to a business
group when the controlling shareholder exercises “controlling influence” over it. The latter
criterion is further detailed to include cases of exchange of directors and managers, and
also substantial business transactions between a firm that belongs to the business group
and the company in question. Because this criterion of controlling influence is interpreted
broadly, some companies legally belong to a group even though neither the families, nor
other aﬃliated companies in the group own shares in those companies.
In the second step, some business groups are designated as chaebols based on size, which is
defined as the value of the combined total assets of aﬃliated companies in the group. From
1987 to 2001, the KFTC annually designated the 30 largest business groups as chaebols.
From 2002 onwards, the KFTC started using a new category by including any group with
total combined assets greater than a certain cutoﬀ in their definition of chaebol. Currently,
these are business groups with combined assets greater than two trillion won.27
From the ownership and financial database that the KFTC has maintained, we obtained
data for the period 1998-2004. We focus only on business groups with the ownership of
a natural person (i.e., family business groups), and exclude other business groups such as
government-controlled business groups. Our ownership data contains 3,545 firm-year obser-
vations.
4.1.1 Summary statistics: ownership variables and firm characteristics
Table 1 shows the average values for the ownership variables across all firm-years in our
sample (Panel A), and the cross-correlation matrix (Panel B). We also include other firm
characteristics that we use in the analysis.
Panel A shows that there are a total of 47 groups and 1085 firms that were present at
some point in the sample between 1998 and 2004. The controlling family holds 13% of the
cash flows of the median firm, but it holds substantially more votes according to our two
alternative measures of voting power. The consistent voting rights measure (VR) yields the
largest voting power. The family and the aﬃliate firms hold 68% of the votes of the median
firm in the sample. In contrast, the critical control threshold (CC) of the median firm is
30%.
The data also indicate a substantial degree of pyramiding in Korean chaebols (the median
position of a firm is 2.06), but with substantial cross-sectional variation (for example, 25%
of the firms show an average position lower than 1.40). The typical pyramid is not deep
(the 75th percentile of the position variable is approximately 2.5). Thus, while many chaebol
firms are owned through pyramids, most of the time there is only one intermediate firm
between the firm in question and the family.
Regarding centrality, the main pattern is that only a few firms are central for the group
structure. The 75th percentile of centrality is zero. Similarly, the median aggregate stake
27Based on the won/dollar exchange rate of 946 on March 9th, 2007, two trillion won amounts to approx-
imately 2.1 billion US dollars.
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held by group firms in other firms is zero, and the 75th percentile is just 3.5%. This statistic
suggests that only a small fraction of firms hold substantial stakes in other firms.
Most chaebol firms are private (74% of firm-years involve unlisted firms). The median
chaebol firm is 13 years old and has 190 employees. Therefore, despite the presence of a
few very large firms in the sample, a typical chaebol involves many firms that are small,
young and privately held. The summary statistics also show that 25% of the firm-years
involve firms in indirect cross-shareholding loops.28 The high incidence of cross-shareholdings
underscores the importance of taking cross-shareholdings into account when computing the
other ownership measures.
In Panel B, we present the simple correlations among the ownership variables and the
other firm characteristics in Panel A. The correlations show that public firms, central firms
and firms in cross-shareholding loops tend to be higher up in the group structure (negative
correlation with position). These variables are also correlated among themselves, that is,
central firms are more likely to be public and belong to loops. Regarding firm characteristics,
central firms are on average older, larger, and more likely to be public than other group firms.
The same pattern holds for cross-shareholdings, which are more common among public,
larger, and older firms. Position, in turn, is negatively correlated with age, public status and
the number of employees.
The measures of cash flow rights and separation between ownership and control display
expected patterns. The family has higher ultimate ownership in private, and smaller firms.
Position is highly positively correlated with both of the separation measures, indicating that
firms in pyramids have higher separation between ownership and control.
4.1.2 The typical structure of a Korean chaebol
Figure 2 summarizes the statistics above by charting the ownership structure of the typical
chaebol. We can think of a typical chaebol structure as being organized in three layers. Some
firms (firms 1, 2 in the figure) are owned directly at the very top of the group (a position
value close to 1), without ownership links to the other firms. The middle layer contains firms
that belong to cross-shareholding loops, and also central firms (firms 3, 4 and 5). Unlike the
firms in the top layer, firms in this middle layer hold equity stakes in other chaebol firms,
including other firms in the middle layer and firms in the bottom layer (such as firms 6, 7,
etc.). Central firms in the middle layer tend to be public, and they are, on average, larger
and older than other chaebol firms. In the bottom layer, in contrast, we observe firms that
are more likely to be private, smaller and younger. These firms do not own substantial stakes
in other firms. Most chaebol firms belong to this bottom layer.
Overall, this snapshot of chaebol structure is largely consistent with the historical evo-
lution of chaebols. Chaebols appear to have grown as the controlling family used successful
(e.g., large, public) group firms to set up and acquire new group firms that are placed at the
28The fraction of firms participating in cross-shareholding loops may seem surprising, given the fact that
Korean regulation prohibits direct cross-shareholdings in chaebols. However, out of the 893 firm-years in
which firms are involved in cross-shareholdings, we find that 72% belong to loops involving three firms, 13%
are in loops involving four firms, and 6% are in loops involving five firms or more. Thus, Korean chaebols
appear to circumvent the regulations prohibiting cross-shareholdings by creating loops of three and more
firms.
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bottom of the group, i.e., those with high position values.29
4.2 Accounting and financial data
In addition to the data obtained from the KFTC, we also used two other databases devel-
oped by Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA) and Korea Investors Service (KIS),
respectively, to obtain additional financial information. KLCA and KIS’s databases contain
information not only on listed companies, but also some private firms that are subject to ex-
ternal audit. We follow the standard procedure of dropping the data on financial institutions
(insurance, brokerage and other financial institutions), which comprise 316 firm-years of the
3,545 firm-years of the sample described in section 4.1. These firms are subject to specific
regulations and accounting rules that make their financial statements less comparable to the
other chaebol firms, which are mostly in the manufacturing sector.
To correctly measure the profitability of each individual chaebol firm, we need to ensure
that reported figures are not aﬀected by equity stakes that a chaebol firm holds in other
firms. From 1999 onwards, the financial statements of Korean chaebol firms became subject
to the equity method reporting rule. The basic idea behind this accounting rule is to record
firm A’s share of firm B’s equity as an asset for firm A, and firm A’s share of firm B’s profits
as a source of non-operating income for firm A. The financial statements contain enough
information to allow us to back out the exact amount by which accounting figures have been
adjusted because of these equity stakes. We use this information to calculate our measures of
assets and profits for chaebol firms, which we denote “stand alone assets” and “stand alone
profits”. The details are provided in Appendix C.
There are similar issues involved in the computation of a measure of Tobin’s Q for chaebol
firms. The market value of a publicly-listed chaebol firm includes the value of the equity
stakes that this firm holds in other chaebol firms, both listed and unlisted. However, adjusting
for the value of equity stakes is more diﬃcult because the market value of private firms (which
comprise a large fraction of the sample) is not observable. Therefore, our preferred measure
of valuation is a measure of Q that is unadjusted for the value of equity stakes:
Q =
EV + Book Value of Liabilities
Book Value of Assets
, (12)
where EV is the market value of equity.
To show that the results are not driven by mismeasurement, we also experiment with a
measure of Q that takes the value of equity stakes into account, “stand alone Q”:
Qsa =
EV + Book value of liabilities - Value of equity stakes
Stand alone assets
. (13)
To compute Qsa we assume that private firms are valued at book value. Provided this
assumption is correct, Qsa can be interpreted as the Q that a group firm would have if it
were valued as a stand-alone entity.
29Aganin and Volpin (2005) also report similar evidence for one particular Italian business groups (the
Pesenti group).
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4.2.1 Summary statistics: accounting and valuation data
Table 2, panel A, reports the summary statistics for the accounting and valuation variables.
Given data availability, we end up with a sample of 2,695 firm-years between 1998 and 2004.30
Our benchmark measure of profitability is stand-alone return on assets (ROA), defined as
stand-alone profits divided by stand-alone assets. For comparison, we also report a measure
of profitability unadjusted for the equity stakes (ordinary income by total assets). The
average unadjusted measure overstates average profitability by a small amount. Stand-alone
assets are lower than total assets because of the adjustment for equity stakes (approximately
by 10% on average). Next, we present statistics on the two measures of Q and the equity
values that we use to compute them. There are a total of 823 firm-years available for public
firms between 1998 and 2004. Notice that Qsa and Q have very similar distributions.31 We
also use capital expenditures divided by stand-alone assets to measure capital intensity, and
non-current liabilities divided by stand-alone assets to measure leverage.32
Panel B displays some of the correlations between the financial and ownership variables.
None of the ownership variables seem to be strongly correlated to stand-alone ROA. Stand-
alone assets are positively correlated with centrality and negatively correlated with position.
Q is negatively correlated with both centrality and separation between ownership and control,
but only if such separation is measured using the CC measure of control. Finally, notice
that capital expenditures are positively correlated with position. Several of these correlation
patterns will be confirmed in the more fully specified regressions that we present below.
5 Empirical tests
We start with the hypothesis about the relative age of group firms (Implication 1). Then we
move on to the hypotheses that relate group structure to accounting and financial variables
(Implications 2, 3 and 4).
5.1 Historical evolution of group structure
As explained above, theory suggests that pyramidal business groups are created as the con-
trolling family uses existing group firms to set up and acquire new firms. In the context
of Figure 2, Implication 1 suggests that firms in the bottom layer of the group (those with
pyramidal ownership) should be younger than central firms. It is less clear whether firms in
the top layer of the group (non-central firms with direct ownership) should also be younger
30The data are winsorized at the first and 99th perecentiles, both in terms of stand-alone return on assets
and stand-alone Q.
31This is consistent with the results in Bohren and Michalsen (1994), who compute distortions due to
double counting of value of firms with cross shareholdings in Norway. Valuation metrics such as price-
earnings ratio are relatively unaﬀected by cross-shareholdings, since there is double counting in both the
numerator and the denominator. In contrast, French and Poterba (1991) report a substantial eﬀect on
cross-shareholdings on price-earning ratios in Japan in the 1980s.
32Korean cash flow statements disaggregate gross investments in tangible assets (e.g., increase in buildings)
from the liquidation of tangible assets (e.g., decrease in buildings). Our capital expenditure measure is the
sum of all gross investment items minus the sum of all liquidation items (e.g., net capital expenditures).
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than the central firms. Note that the top layer can include young firms that the family chose
to control directly, but also older firms that have not become central firms.
Consistent with Implication 1, the summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that central
firms are older and pyramidal firms younger than other group firms. To provide additional
evidence, we use two diﬀerent specifications that relate age to the firm’s placement in the
group structure. First, we regress the centrality measure on firm’s age. We include group
dummies since we want to know whether, within each group, central firms are older. We
also include year dummies and other firms characteristics (size and public status). In the
second specification, we regress the firm’s position on firm’s age. In addition to the same
set of controls used in the first specification, we also control for centrality. This regression
allows us to compare the age of firms in the bottom layer of the group (which tend not
to be central) with the age of firms owned directly by the family, while controlling for the
correlation between centrality and age. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table 3 presents the results. The first regression shows that, within each group, older
firms are more likely to be central. Age and centrality continue to be correlated even after
controlling for other firm characteristics such as public status and size, which are also related
to centrality. The age coeﬃcient in column (2) implies that 15 additional years of age are
associated with an increase in centrality of 0.012, which is close to the average value of
centrality in Table 1.33 Consistent with our expectations, public and larger firms are also
more likely to be central. Columns (3) and (4) show that age is also related to position in
a way that is consistent with Implication 1. The coeﬃcient on age in column (4) implies
that 15 years of age decrease position by approximately 0.2, or 10% of the average position.
Finally, notice that position is negatively related to age even after controlling for centrality
(column (5)). This implies that even among non-central firms, those in lower tiers of the
pyramid are, on average, younger than those at the top of the group. Overall, these results
support Implication 1.
5.2 Predicting group structure
Implication 2 relates the profitability of group firms to their position in the group. Specif-
ically, firms with lower profitability should be placed in the bottom layer of the group.
However, the tunneling argument also predicts a negative correlation between position and
profitability. Once a firm is placed in a low position in the group, its performance is expected
to deteriorate as cash flows are tunneled to firms higher up in the group structure (in which
the family retains larger ultimate ownership).
In this Section we present evidence that the first eﬀect (selection) is at work. We start
by replicating findings from the previous literature in our data by estimating a regression of
profitability on the family’s ultimate ownership. We then experiment with empirical models
in which position is the endogenous variable. In particular, we attempt to isolate the eﬀect
of profitability on the family’s decision about where to place a firm in the group using a
battery of complementary tests.
33The coeﬃcients on firm age are multiplied by one hundred.
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5.2.1 Family ownership and profitability
In order to examine the correlation between profitability and ownership measures, we use
the following empirical model:








where we use both ultimate ownership and the measures of separation between ownership and
control as alternative ownership variables. The vector of controls include firm size (measured
by the log of stand-alone assets), age and public status, and leverage. We control for size,
age and public status because all these variables are correlated with ownership variables
(see Tables 2 and 3), and because they could also be related to performance. Controlling
for leverage is important because the profitability measure that we use is computed after
interest payments.34 In some specifications, we also include other measures of group structure
(namely centrality and cross-shareholdings) to examine their correlations with profitability.35
We also control for industry and year fixed eﬀects. The industry classification corresponds
roughly to a 2-digit SIC classification in the US (there are 45 diﬀerent industries in the
sample). In some specifications, we also include group fixed eﬀects to measure within-group
eﬀects. The standard errors are clustered at the level of the firm.
The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) shows the standard positive correlation
between ultimate ownership and profitability. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of
group dummies (column (4)). Interestingly, ultimate ownership appears to be more robustly
related to profitability than the measures of separation between ownership and control. In
columns (2) and (3), only separation V R is negatively correlated with profitability, and the
correlation is not robust to the inclusion of group dummies (column (5)). Notice also that
centrality is negatively correlated with profitability, but cross-shareholdings is not (columns
(7) and (8)). The control variables have signs that are consistent with expectations. In
particular, larger firms have greater profitability, and highly-levered firms have lower prof-
itability. These results show that we can replicate traditional findings based on the tunneling
argument in our data.
5.2.2 Pyramids, profitability and capital intensity
In order to examine the family’s choice of where to place a firm in the group structure,
we experiment with empirical models in which position is the dependent variable. Theory
predicts that the controlling family is more likely to place a firm in a pyramid (high position),
if the firm has low profitability, and high capital requirements. However, the theory has no
clear prediction about the relative profitability and capital intensity of the central firms (those
at the middle layer of Figure 2). This observation suggests that the eﬀect of profitability and
34An alternative way of controlling for this eﬀect is to use a “before-interest” profitability measure. All
results presented in the paper are robust to this change.
35Since the position variable is highly correlated with ultimate ownership and separation variables, it does
not make sense to include them together in the same specification.
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capital intensity on a firm’s position should be particularly pronounced among non-central
firms.
We begin by estimating the following empirical model for both non-central and central
firms separately:








Implication 2 suggests that the coeﬃcient α1 should be negative, and Implication 3 sug-
gests that the coeﬃcient α2 should be positive. We use lagged accounting variables because
the theory on group formation suggests that profitability and capital intensity should predict
pyramidal ownership. We recognize, though, that simply lagging the performance variables
is not suﬃcient to provide evidence on causality, and we address the issue of causality in
greater detail below.
As a first stab towards providing evidence for selection, we also include current prof-
itability (Stand-alone ROAi,t) among the controls in some specifications. To the extent that
profitability predicts position, the correlation between profitability and position should be
stronger for lagged profitability than for current profitability. The other controls are identical
to those used in Table 4 above (firm size, age, public status, leverage, and dummies for year,
industry and group in some specifications). We divide the sample in central and non-central
firms using the mean value of centrality as a cutoﬀ. In other words, in the following tables
“central firms” (“non-central firms”) are those for which centrality is greater (lower) than
its mean value of 0.02 (see Table 1).
The results are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) show that, for non-central firms,
both lagged profitability and lagged capital expenditures are correlated with position in a
way that is consistent with Implications 2 and 3, both before and after controlling for group
fixed eﬀects. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these correlations are largely absent
in the sample of central firms (columns (3) and (4)). In particular, after controlling for group
fixed eﬀects, lagged profitability and capital expenditures have a positive and non-significant
correlation with position in the sample of central firms. Columns (5) to (8) repeat the same
regressions after including current profitability in the empirical model. Clearly, the negative
correlation between profitability is position is driven by lagged profitability for non-central
firms. Again, this pattern is consistent with a selection story in which the family places low
profitability firms in pyramids. The control variables have the expected sign. For example,
older and larger firms are more likely to be found at the top of the group.
5.2.3 Does profitability predict pyramidal ownership?
The negative correlation between lagged profitability of non-central firms and their position
in the group structure reported in Table 5 is consistent with Implication 2. However, these
results may not be suﬃcient to rule out a reverse explanation due to tunneling. In this
Section, we provide two additional tests that attempt to further distinguish between the
selection and the tunneling stories. Both tests exploit the dynamic nature of our data, in
that they both focus on large shocks to the group structure.
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Evidence from large changes in position One of the challenges in interpreting the
results in Table 5 is that lagging profitability might not be suﬃcient to show that it influences
firm’s position because the position of an individual group firm does not vary much over time.
It could also be the case that past profitability was determined by the firm’s relative position
in the group, which might be very similar to the current position. In fact, in most firm-years
position changes very little. The 25% percentile of the distribution of annual firm-level
changes in the position variable is -0.024, while the 75% percentile is 0.04. Thus, and not
surprisingly, most of the variation in position is cross-sectional.
In order to provide additional evidence for the profitability selection story, we experiment
with instances of large changes in a firm’s position in a group. Specifically, we create dummy
variables that capture cases in which a firm’s position changed by more than 0.10 from one
year to the next. This cutoﬀ represents more than 10% of the total standard deviation in the
position variable.36 The variable Position Increase takes the value of 1 if position increased
by more than 0.10 from one year to the next, and zero otherwise (there are 388 firm-years
that satisfy this criterion). The variable Position Decrease takes the value of 1 if position
decreased by more than −0.10 from one year to the next, and zero otherwise (there are 278
firm-years that satisfy this criterion). We then replace the variable Position with Position
Increase and Position Decrease in Equation 15. Since our dependent variable is a dummy
we use a probit model for these regressions.
The results from these regressions are reported in the four first columns of Table 6.
Clearly, lagged profitability helps predict large changes in position in a way that is consistent
with Implication 2. The first two columns show that low past profitability predicts increases
in a firm’s position in the group structure, both before and after controlling for group fixed
eﬀects. Thus, poor past performance predicts that a firm will be move to the bottom of the
pyramid. High past profitability also predicts decreases in position after group dummies are
included in the empirical model. This result suggests that high within-group performance
predicts a change in group structure that moves a firm closer to the family, at the top of the
group.
Evidence from new chaebol firms A diﬀerent way to overcome the lack of time series
variability in the position variable is to examine cases in which the family decides for the
first time where to place a firm in the group structure. Specifically, there are 303 firms in
our data that appear as chaebol firms for the first time in the sample window of 1998-2004.
For 163 of these firms, we also have performance data the year prior to their inclusion. While
the size of the sample is drastically reduced if we study only these firms, examining a firm’s
profitability before it is added to a chaebol allows for sharper tests of causality. To wit, if
lower profitability does predict pyramidal ownership (Implication 2), then the relationship
uncovered in Table 5 should also hold if we measure the firm’s profitability before it became
a chaebol firm. Presumably, a firm’s profitability in the year prior to becoming a chaebol
firm cannot be aﬀected by the ownership structure chosen later by the chaebol ’s controlling
family. However, pre-chaebol profitability should explain the firm’s ownership structure,
36The results that we present are invariant to the particular cutoﬀ used. We have also experimented with
using changes larger than the mean change in position (0.03), or changes larger than certain percentiles of
the distribution of the position variable (25% and 75% for example).
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according to Implication 2.
The last four columns of Table 6 contain the results. In columns (5) and (6), we run the
regression in Equation (15) using only the sample of new chaebol firms. Low profitability
continues to predict that a new firm will be controlled through a pyramid (high position),
before and after including group dummies. These results suggest that when the family adds
a new firm to the group that has low profitability relative to other group firms, it is more
likely to place such a firm in a pyramidal structure. These results support the direction of
causality suggested by Implication 2 (the selection story). The economic magnitude of the
profitability eﬀect also appears to be large. In column (5), for example, the estimates imply
that a one standard-deviation decrease in profitability increases the firm’s first position in
the group by approximately 0.16 (which corresponds to 19% of the overall standard deviation
of the position variable).
In columns (7) to (8), we perform two robustness checks. First, since the sample size is
relatively small, we check whether the result is driven by a few outliers by winsorizing the
data (both the position and the lagged profitability variables) at a 1% level.37 Column (7)
shows that the results are unchanged. Second, our argument rests on the assumption that
a firm’s profitability in the year prior to becoming a chaebol firm cannot be aﬀected by its
ownership structure. Nevertheless, in some cases a firm might have been owned by another
chaebol in the year prior to its acquisition, and through a pyramid. In these cases, the firm’s
lagged profitability might have been aﬀected by its placement in a pyramidal structure. To
ensure that this story does not explain our results, we eliminate all cases in which we can
determine that a firm belonged to another chaebol in the year prior to its first appearance
in a new chaebol. There are 16 of these cases. As column (8) shows, eliminating these firms
does not aﬀect the previous results.
5.2.4 Discussion: predicting group structure
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that profitability and capital
expenditure requirements are correlated with past profitability in a way that is consistent
with the selection hypothesis discussed in Section 2. The family appears to select low prof-
itability firms, and firms with high capital expenditure requirements into pyramids. While
the existing literature suggests an alternative explanation for the profitability results (that
pyramiding reduces profitability), we present evidence consistent with the direction of causal-
ity suggested in Section 2 (low profitability predicts pyramiding).
We note that our results do not rule out the possibility that the family tunnels cash
flows out of firms that it decides to place in pyramids. The empirical tests are designed
to provide evidence for the selection implication, and not to directly test the alternative
tunneling story. In order to do the latter (which is not our goal here), we would need an
exogenous source of variation in ownership structure. We also note that the two stories are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, in Almeida and Wolfenzon’s (2006) model,
the family will ex-post divert more cash flows from firms that it decides to place in pyramids
ex-ante (because its ultimate ownership stake in that firm is lower). However, our results do
suggest is that profitability is also an important determinant of a firm’s ownership structure.
37Results are identical if we winsorize at a 5% level instead.
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5.3 Valuation and centrality
We now test Implication 4 that central firms should trade at a discount relative to non-
central firms in the group. According to theory, this valuation discount is due to minority
shareholders’ anticipation of future pyramidal investments by central firms. We run the
following regression:






yeart + εi,t, (16)
where the controls include firm size (measured by the market value of total assets), age
and public status, leverage, capital expenditures (to control for growth opportunities), and
stand-alone ROA (to control for current profitability). The previous literature reports some
evidence that firms in which the family retains low ownership but high voting rights trade at
discounts. Thus, in some specifications we control for measures of ownership concentration
and separation between ownership and control. To measure centrality, we use both the
benchmark measure (Equation (9)), and also the firm i’s aggregate equity stake in other
firms normalized by firm i’s assets (Equation (10)). We also include a variable that measures
whether a firm belongs to a cross-shareholding loop, because, as explained in Section 5.1,
central firms also tend to be part of such loops. We control for industry and year fixed
eﬀects, and also for group fixed eﬀects in some specifications. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. Implication 4 suggests that the coeﬃcient γ1 should be negative.
Table 7 presents the results. Column (1) indicates that centrality is negatively related to
firm valuation. The other variables have the expected signs. Larger and younger firms have
higher Q, as do firms with high growth opportunities, proxied by their capital expenditures.
There is also some indication that firms in cross-shareholding loops also trade at a discount,
though this eﬀect is not significant statistically. These results remain the same after con-
trolling for ultimate ownership and the separation between ownership and control (columns
(2), (3) and (4)). Interestingly, only the measure of separation based on the critical control
threshold is significant in these regressions, with the standard negative sign that other pa-
pers in the literature have documented. In columns (5) to (8), we include group dummies.
The correlation between centrality and valuation also holds within groups, suggesting that,
in each group, central firms carry lower valuations than other group firms. These results
support Implication 4.
The magnitude of central firms’ valuation discount also appears to be significant. The
distribution of the centrality variable is very modal (see Table 1), with 75% of the firms
having a zero value for centrality, while a few firms (5% of the sample) have centrality values
greater than 10%. If we look at these extremes, the coeﬃcients on Table 7 (which range
approximately from 0.4 to 0.6) imply that a firm with a centrality value equal to 10% would
have a Q that is 4.5% to 6.5% lower than a firm with zero centrality.38
We have also done some robustness checks to verify that the results in Table 7 are robust
to our definition of centrality and valuation measures. The results are reported in the text.
Given the diﬃculties in measuring control, which is a crucial component of our centrality
measure, we also use the stake variable to measure centrality (see Equation 10). Given that
38This calculation assumes that other variables are evaluated at their unconditional averages, that is, the
discount is 4.5% to 6.5% of average Q (which is 0.9 in our data according to Table 2).
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the definition of stake is independent of our measure of control, these tests help alleviate
concerns that the results are driven by the particular control measure we used. The results
of our valuation regressions suggest that this is not the case - stake is also negatively and
significantly related to firm valuation. In addition, we test whether our results are sensitive
to our definition of Q. Given the diﬃculty to adjust Q for the values of equity stakes (see
Section 4.2), we used unadjusted Q in our benchmark regressions. However, our robustness
checks suggest that the results remain if we use Qsa (the implied stand-alone market-to-
book ratio of chaebol firms) to value chaebol firms. In particular, centrality is negatively
and statistically significantly related to Qsa.
In addition to the systematic evidence, there are many examples of low valuation of
central chaebol firms. A well known case is that of SK Corporation, the most central firm
in the SK group. In December 2003, the market capitalization of SK Corporation (the
largest oil refinery in Korea) was approximately 2.9 billion dollars. Besides several stakes in
private group firms, SK Corporation had a stake of 20% on SK Telecom (the largest mobile
telecom company in Korea), which was worth 13.6 billion dollars, and a 39% stake in SK
Networks, which was worth 4.3 billion dollars. The value of these equity stakes alone (i.e.,
assuming a zero value for the stakes in private firms) was 4.4 billion dollars. Thus, the implied
equity value of SK Corporation’s stand alone assets was -1.5 billion dollars. One possible
explanation for SK Corporation’s negative equity value is that the firm had a large amount
of liabilities (book value of liabilities equal to 8.1 billion dollars). If we add the entire amount
of the book liabilities to SK Corporation’s stand alone equity value, we obtain a stand alone
market value of 6.6 billion dollars for SK Corporation. Under these assumptions, the implied
stand-alone Q (Qsa) of SK Corporation was 0.68 in December 2003. The true Qsa was likely
to be even lower, because the stakes in private firms are not worthless, and because the book
value of liabilities probably overestimates the true market value of debt of SK corporation.
This relatively low valuation for SK Corporation attracted the interest of an activist
investment fund that specializes in emerging market stocks (the Sovereign Fund), which
amassed 15% of SK Corporation shares in the market during 2003 and started issuing
takeover threats. Sovereign’s attack subsequently raised SK Corporation’s equity value.
As a result, by December 2004, SK Corporation’s Qsa had increased to 0.92. The initial low
valuation of SK Corporation is consistent with the argument that central firms should be
discounted due to anticipated pyramiding. In addition, the increase in its market value after
the Sovereign Fund amassed a large stake might be due to the market’s realization that the
large blockholder would prevent some of this pyramiding.
5.3.1 Discussion: central firms’ valuation discount
The key characteristic of central firms is that they hold substantial equity stakes in other
firms. Thus, the finding that central firms have low valuations bears some resemblance
to the closed-end fund puzzle (see, i.e, Shleifer (2000)). Closed-end mutual funds tend to
trade at substantial discounts relative to the NAV (net asset value) of the securities in
their portfolios.39 In particular, some of the explanations developed to explain the closed-
end fund puzzle bear some resemblance to Implication 4. It is possible, for example, that
39See Rommens, Deloof and Jegers (2008), for related evidence using data from Belgian holding companies.
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shareholders of the closed-end fund expect poor portfolio management in the future (similar
to Implication 4). Nevertheless, not all arguments regarding the closed end fund puzzle
seem equally relevant. For example, the investor sentiment story explained in Shleifer (2000)
applied to the chaebol context would require individual investors (who are more subject to
fluctuations in sentiment when compared to institutional investors) to be more likely to hold
and trade shares of the parent company, relative to the subsidiaries. Although we do not
examine this issue directly in this paper, there is no reason to expect that condition to hold
in the Korean data.
Cornell and Liu (2001), Mitchell, Pulvino and Staﬀord (2002) and Lamont and Thaler
(2003) provide evidence on another phenomenon that bears some resemblance to the central
firm discount (the “parent company discount”). For example, in the period of 1985-2000,
Mitchell, Pulvino and Staﬀord (2002) identify 70 firms in which the market value of the
equity stake that the parent holds in the subsidiary is higher than the market value of the
parent. Lamont and Thaler (2003) show some extreme examples of potential misvaluations
(such as the Palm and 3Com example), in which a commitment by the parent to spin-oﬀ
the shares of the subsidiary at a fixed rate in a future date creates an apparently clear
“arbitrage” opportunity.40 The standard explanation for this phenomenon in the US is that
it is due to noise traders bidding up the prices of the subsidiary stocks, and arbitrage costs
that make a price correction diﬃcult to sustain (a large fraction of the firms analyzed in
these studies are in the internet sector). We believe this market ineﬃciency story is also not
likely to explain the central firm discount in Korea. First, the Korean phenomenon seems
to be more general and persistent than the internet bubble-related discounts in the US. In
particular, the subsidiaries of central Korean firms are not concentrated in any particular
industry. Second, given the particular governance and ownership characteristics of Korean
corporate finance, it seems a priori very likely that the valuation discount should be linked to
agency issues related to family control of business groups rather than mispricing of chaebol
firms.41
6 Final remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to shed new light on the process by which pyramids
form. In doing this, we depart from the standard approach of assuming that ownership
structure is exogenously given. We take advantage of a unique dataset that allows us to
observe the details of the ownership structure of Korean chaebols, and to have a small window
on how chaebol structure evolves over time. We see this paper as a first step towards the
understanding of the evolution of business groups. Naturally, many questions are open for
future research.
First of all, it would be interesting to see if our findings about group structure are
particular to Korean chaebols or if they extend to groups in other countries as well. For that
40The spin-oﬀ fixed a ratio of shares of Palm that each 3Com shareholder would receive (1.5) in one year,
subject to SEC approval. However, 3Com traded at a price that was substantially lower than 1.5 times the
price of Palm. Ross (2004) oﬀers a rational explanation for this phenomenon.
41Cornell and Liu (2001) discuss agency and liquidity explanations of US parent company discounts, and
reject both possibilities in favor of the market ineﬃciency story above.
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purpose, we note that the metrics of ownership structure that we derive in the paper (such
as the critical control threshold, position, and centrality) can be easily applied to other data.
To facilitate the implementation of our measures, we provide algorithms that can be used to
calculate these variables for groups of any complexity.
Second, while our short time series allows us to observe a few major changes in ownership
structure (such as the addition of new firms to the group), there are many questions that
require a longer time series. For example, besides observing that central firms are the most
established firms in the group, we have little to say about how the family chooses central
firms among several candidate group firms. Given that centrality changes little over time,
addressing such a question requires a much longer time series than the one we currently have.
Last, but not least, we have focused exclusively on understanding the family’s choice of
ownership for chaebol firms, ignoring the question of why a given firm becomes a chaebol
member in the first place. Clearly, understanding the selection of firms into chaebol is an
essential component of a complete theory of business group structure. In addition, while
we have taken the presence of cross-shareholdings into account to compute our ownership
measure, we have not attempted to understand the reasons that motivate the family to create
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Figure A1: A simple group
A Numerical examples of position, voting rights and
centrality
We illustrate the computation of our main ownership measures using a simple example. The
group is represented in Figure A1. The family owns a 40% direct stake in firm 1 and a
10% direct stake in firm 2. In addition, firm 1 owns a 50% stake in firm 2. While this
simple structure is not representative of real world chaebol structures, it can help the reader
understand the logic behind the new measures.
Ultimate ownership
Ultimate ownership is easy to compute. The family’s ultimate ownership in firm 1 is 40%
and in firm 2 is 10% + (40%)(50%) = 30%.
Position
Firm’s 1 position is clearly equal to 1 as there is only one chain leading to that firm.
The formula we propose leads to the same answer: .4
.4
· 1 = 1. Regarding firm 2, the family





· 1 + 0.2
0.3
· 2 = 1.7. (17)
This is intuitive, since firm 2’s ownership is close to a pure pyramid (the biggest stake is
held through firm 1), but it is not a pure pyramid because of the direct stake of 10%.
Voting rights
Take, for example, a control threshold equal to 30% (T = 30%). In that case, the family
controls firm 1 (since it holds 40% of its votes). According to our formula, the family has 50%
of the votes in firm 2 (10% directly and 50% through firm 1, which it controls). Thus, the
family also controls firm 2. Clearly, the family controls both firms for any control threshold
lower than or equal to 40%. Thus:
C(T ) = {1, 2} for any T ≤ 40%. (18)
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For T above 40%, the family no longer controls firm 1. Also, the votes it controls in firm
2 are only 10% (we no longer add the 50% since for T > 40% the family does not control
firm 1). Thus, the family does not control firm 2 either:
C(T ) = ∅ for any T > 40%. (19)
It follows that the critical control threshold measures are:
CC1 = CC2 = 40%. (20)
The V R measures for any T ≤ 40% are:
V R1 = 40%
V R2 = 10%+ 50% = 60%.
The VR measure adds the entire stake held by firm 1 in firm 2 to the direct stake of 10%,
as long as the family retains control of firm 1. If T > 40%, V R2 drops to 10%.
Centrality
To compute centrality measures we compute the average critical control threshold with
and without the relevant firm. Let’s start with firm 2. We know that CC1 = 40%. If we
eliminate firm 2 from the group and recompute CC1, we would still have CC1 = 40%. This
implies that eliminating firm 2 from the group does not aﬀect the average voting rights in
other group firms. Accordingly, the centrality of firm 2 is 0.
In contrast, if we eliminate firm 1, the family will only control firm 2 if T ≤ 10%. That





B Computing the set C(T )
We first provide a formal definition of the algorithm to compute C(T ) and then we explain
how it works.
Definition 6 (Algorithm) Let the sequence of sets S(0) ⊇ S(1) ⊇ S(2)... be defined by
S(0) = N, and S(n+ 1) = {i ∈ S(n) : fi +
P
j∈S(n), j 6=i sji ≥ T}.
The idea behind this algorithm is to start with all the firms, S(0) = N. In the first stage,
we assume that the family controls all the firms and we drop the firms in which the direct
and indirect stake of the family is below T. This procedure generates S(1). Next, we assume
that the family controls only the firms in S(1) and again drop from S(1) the firms in which
the direct and indirect stake of the family is below T . This generates S(2). We can repeat
this algorithm a number ]N of times to arrive at S(]N). This last set is important in light
of the following Proposition.
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Proposition 4 S(]N) satisfies condition (7) which we re-write here:
C(T ) = {i ∈ N : fi +
X
j∈C(T ), j 6=i
sji ≥ T}.
A property that simplifies the algorithm is that if S(n) = S(n + 1) for n < ]N then
S(]N) = S(n). This means that we can stop the computation of the algorithm the first time
we do not drop a firm.
To prove this proposition, we need to show S(]N) = {i ∈ N : fi+
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T}.
The proof is divided into a number of steps.
Step 1: S(]N) = S(]N + 1).
Consider two cases: 1) S(]N) = ∅ and 2) S(]N) 6= ∅. In case 1), the lemma follows
directly from the definition of S(]N + 1). In case 2), we have that, after ]N stages, there
are firms that are not yet eliminated. Because we started with ]N firms, this means that
there was a stage n ≤ ]N such that no firm was dropped. In other words, we have that
S(n) = S(n− 1). We can now compute S(n+ 1) = {i ∈ S(n) : fi +
P
j∈S(n), j 6=i sji ≥ T} =
{i ∈ S(n − 1) : fi +
P
j∈S(n−1), j 6=i sji ≥ T} = S(n), where the first equality follows from
S(n) = S(n− 1) and the second from the definition of S(n). Analogously, we can show that
S(n) = S(n+ 1) = S(n+ 2) = . . . = S(]N) = S(]N + 1). The last equality proves step 1.
Step 2: S(]N) ⊆ {i ∈ N : fi +
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T}
Note that S(]N) = S(]N + 1) = {i ∈ S(]N) : fi +
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T}, where the first
equality follows from step 1 and the second is simply the definition of S(]N + 1). Because
S(]N) ⊆ N, it is clear that i ∈ S(]N)⇒ i ∈ {i ∈ N : fi +
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T}.
Step 3: S(]N) ⊇ {i ∈ N : fi +
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T}
Towards a contradiction, we suppose that k ∈ { i ∈ N : fi +
P
j∈S(]N), j 6=i sji ≥ T} and




sjk ≥ T. (21)
The last condition implies that firm k was eliminated in some earlier stage in the algorithm,
say stage n. Thus k ∈ S(n− 1) but k /∈ S(n). We now have
T > fk +
X
j∈S(n−1), j 6=k




where the first inequality follows from the fact that firm k was eliminated in round n and
the second inequality follows from S(n − 1) ⊇ S(]N) and the fact that sij ≥ 0. This is a
contradiction because Equations 21 and 22 cannot hold at the same time. Putting together
steps 2 and 3 leads to the statement of the Proposition.¥
One problem that we need to address is the existence of multiple sets that satisfy condition
4. Consider the example in Figure A2, and assume that T = 25%. Clearly, we have that
C(25%) = {1, 2, 3} because the set {1, 2, 3} satisfies condition 4. However, the null set





































Figure A2: A complex group with many cross-shareholdings
controls no firms, then its voting rights in firms 1, 2 and 3 are 5%, 7%, and 10%, respectively.
Note that all of them are below the threshold of 25%, confirming that the family does not
control any of these firms.
Because in the case of Korea the firms with which we start (the set N) have already
been pre-classified as members of the chaebol, we would like to choose the set that satisfies
Condition 7 and at the same time has the maximum number of firms. We can prove the
following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider all possible sets of firms that satisfy condition 7 for a given control
threshold T : C1, C2, . . . , CM . The following holds: S(]N) =
SM
i=1Ci.
This proposition of important for two reasons. First, it tells us that there is a unique
set that has the maximum number of firms over all the sets that satisfy Condition 7. This
is important since it removes the arbitrariness of picking a set among many. Second, the
proposition tells us that the outcome of the algorithm is precisely the set we are looking for.
The proof of this result is divided into two steps.
Step 1: S(]N) ⊆
SM
i=1Ci
By Proposition 4, we know that S(]N) satisfy Condition 7, thus there is a m such that
S(]N) = Cm. The result follows.
Step 2: S(]N) ⊇
SM
i=1Ci
We show that Cm ⊆ S(]N) for all m = 1 . . .M. Step 2 follows directly from this. Take a
set Cm. Because Cm satisfies Condition 7 the following is true:
For all k ∈ Cm, fk +
X
j∈Cm, j 6=k
sjk ≥ T (23)
Towards a contradiction, suppose that some of the firms in Cm are not in S(]N). That
is, there must be a stage in the algorithm in which the first firm of Cm is eliminated. Let
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that stage be n. We then have that Cm ⊆ S(n − 1) but there is at least one k ∈ Cm such
that k /∈ S(n). We now have that
T > fk +
X
j∈S(n−1), j 6=k




where the first inequality follows from the fact that k is eliminated in round n and the
second follows from Cm ⊆ S(n−1) and the fact that sjk ≥ 0. This is a contradiction because
Equations 23 and 24 cannot hold at the same time. This proves step 2. Finally, putting
together steps 1 and 2 leads to the statement of the proposition.¥
C Accounting measures of stand-alone assets and stand-
alone profits
After January 1st, 2003, the item ‘stocks accounted in equity method’ (code number KLCA
123560) reports the aggregate book value of the shares subject to the equity method. Be-
fore 2003, however, ‘stocks accounted in equity method’ was not separately recorded but
pooled into all investment securities. The data are available from the footnotes to financial
statements, which we examined to calculate this item for the remaining years. Regard-
ing profits, the profits coming from aﬃliate companies (call it “equity method profits”) are
recorded in two items in the non-operating portion of the income statement of parent com-
panies. If equity method profits are positive, they are called “Gain on valuation of Equity
Method” (KLCA # 242100). If they are negative, they are called “Loss on valuation of
Equity Method” (KLCA # 252600).
With this knowledge, it is easy to adjust the financial statements to back out the values
of the accounting figures that refer to each individual chaebol firm. Specifically, we have:
Stand-alone Assets = Total Assets - Equity Method Stock, (25)
and:
Stand-alone Profits = Total Profits - Gains from Equity Method + Losses from Equity Method,
(26)
where we define stand-alone Assets/Profits as the asset/profit values that the chaebol firm
would have in the absence of the equity method adjustment. These asset/profit figures reflect
the individual assets and profitability of each chaebol firm.
One issue with the calculation of stand-alone profits is that one cannot easily back out
the tax implications of the equity method adjustments. For example, if aﬃliate companies
provide profits to a parent, the parent’s taxes will be higher. However, we do not know
exactly how much higher. Thus, in the calculations below, we use a pre-tax measure of
profitability to measure each firm’s Total Profits that we input in equation 26 (specifically,
we use ordinary income to measure total profits).
We also check the data for basic consistency requirements. In particular, if the balance
sheet shows a number for the equity method stock (i.e., if item KLCA#123560 is non-
missing), then there should also be an item in the income statement for gains and losses
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from equity method (i.e., KLCA#242100 and KLCA#252600 cannot both be missing). The
reverse should also hold. In addition, it should not be the case that both items KLCA#242100
and KLCA#252600 are positive, since aﬃliates will either generate a profit or a loss. We















Variable Mean StDev Median 25% 75% Firm-years
Ultimate ownership 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.28 3545
VR 0.68 0.28 0.68 0.47 1.00 3545
CC 0.33 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.43 3545
Separation VR 0.47 0.29 0.44 0.23 0.73 3545
Separation CC 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.19 3545
Position 2.11 0.82 2.06 1.40 2.56 3545
Centrality 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 3521
Stake 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.04 3545
Cross-shareholdings 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 3545
Public 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 3545
Employees 1198 3755 190 43 840 3545












Ult Own Separ VR Separ CC Position Centrality Cross-SH Public Employees
Separation VR -0.42
Separation CC -0.50 0.28
Position -0.52 0.60 0.54
Centrality 0.10 -0.25 0.06 -0.26
Cross-SH -0.06 -0.20 -0.04 -0.18 0.21
Public -0.16 -0.44 0.06 -0.23 0.37 0.42
Employees -0.09 -0.18 0.01 -0.16 0.24 0.30 0.35













Mean StDev 25% Median 75% Firm-years
Stand-alone ROA 0.263 0.124 -0.008 0.030 0.088 2695
ROA 0.027 0.124 -0.006 0.031 0.090 2695
Assets (million USD) 794 2,320 29 110 527 2695
Stand-alone assets (million USD) 714 2,029 27 103 489 2695
Q 0.917 0.324 0.734 0.838 0.994 823
Qsa 0.908 0.363 0.707 0.828 1.011 806
Mkt value of equity (million USD) 2,089 5,191 224 706 1,968 823
Stand alone mkt value of equity (million USD) 1,905 4,833 214 634 1,811 806
Capital expenditures/stand-alone assets 0.056 0.148 0.008 0.029 0.073 2601





Capex/stand-alone assets 0.076 -0.005 0.246
Leverage -0.251 0.075 -0.004 0.009
Separation VR -0.033 -0.190 -0.027 0.068 0.011
Separation CC -0.003 0.028 -0.101 0.037 0.051
Position 0.037 -0.137 0.082 0.139 -0.021
Centrality -0.001 0.252 -0.147 -0.057 0.068
















Firm age 0.142*** 0.082*** -1.722*** -1.287*** -1.043***
(8.14) (5.01) (-10.88) (-6.00) (-4.76)
Public 0.024*** -0.152** -0.099
(4.66) (-2.20) (-1.43)




Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3521 3521 3545 3545 3545
R-squared 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level






















Dependent variable: Stand-alone ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm age -0.407 -0.306 -0.286 -0.155 -0.128 -0.112 -0.307 -0.096
(-1.48) (-1.12) (-1.05) (-0.52) (-0.43) (-0.37) (-1.06) (-0.31)
Ln assets 0.008 *** 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.009 *** 0.007 **
(2.76) (2.40) (2.33) (2.13) (2.08) (2.13) (2.95) (2.21)
Public -0.004 -0.013 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.41) (-1.39) (-0.69) (-0.10) (-0.99) (-0.44) (-0.25) (-0.05)
Leverage -0.104 *** -0.103 *** -0.103 *** -0.099 *** -0.099 *** -0.099 *** -0.103 *** -0.099 ***
(-5.88) (-5.87) (-5.93) (-5.34) (-5.31) (-5.35) (-5.79) (-5.28)
Ultimate ownership 0.058 *** 0.044 ** 0.063 *** 0.05 ***
(3.98) (2.49) (4.21) (2.76)
Separation VR -0.023 * -0.018
(-1.77) (-1.37)
Separation CC -0.034 -0.02
(-1.30) (-0.67)




Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2620 2620
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24












Non-central firms Central firms Non-central firms Central firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stand-alone ROA t-1 -0.388 ** -0.303 * -0.721 0.153 -0.399 *** -0.272 * -0.565 0.114
(-2.49) (-1.87) (-1.42) (0.36) (-2.60) (-1.76) (-1.10) (0.28)
Stand-alone ROA t 0.039 -0.118 -0.451 0.195
(0.19) (-0.59) (-1.26) (0.49)
Capex t-1 0.310 ** 0.344 *** -0.214 0.008 0.311 ** 0.341 *** -0.136 -0.014
(2.37) (2.94) (-0.54) (0.03) (2.37) (2.93) (-0.33) (-0.04)
Firm age -7.605 ** -8.379 ** 1.784 8.109 * -7.602 ** -8.366 ** 1.505 8.295 *
(-2.46) (-2.58) (0.53) (1.67) (-2.46) (-2.57) (0.45) (1.67)
Ln assets 0.000 -0.037 -0.075 -0.076 0.000 -0.037 -0.074 -0.076
(-0.01) (-1.45) (-1.57) (-1.30) (-0.01) (-1.45) (-1.56) (-1.31)
Public -0.038 -0.003 -0.337 ** -0.448 ** -0.038 -0.003 -0.328 ** -0.455 **
(-0.42) (-0.03) (-2.13) (-2.45) (-0.41) (-0.04) (-2.10) (-2.45)
Leverage -0.124 * -0.109 * -0.048 -0.113 -0.123 * -0.112 * -0.096 -0.104
(-1.68) (-1.67) (-0.17) (-0.54) (-1.65) (-1.69) (-0.33) (-0.49)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1693 1693 391 391 1693 1693 391 391






















Position increase Position decrease Position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stand-alone ROA t-1 -0.891 *** -1.112 *** 0.286 0.745 * -1.273 ** -1.131 * -1.078 ** -1.211 **
(-2.81) (-2.99) (0.90) (1.90) (-2.52) (-1.86) (-2.55) (-2.16)
Firm age -4.490 -3.696 -3.139 0.477 15.830 * 20.800 ** 15.700 * 13.500
(-1.22) (-0.84) (-0.80) (0.11) (1.91) (2.34) (1.89) (1.54)
Ln assets 0.064 ** 0.024 0.031 -0.024 0.029 -0.036 0.033 0.003
(2.09) (0.67) (1.05) (-0.71) (0.44) (-0.57) (0.49) (0.04)
Public 0.021 0.030 -0.008 -0.101 -0.899 *** -0.981 *** -0.890 *** -0.790 ***
(0.16) (0.22) (-0.07) (-0.84) (-3.96) (-3.90) (-3.95) (-3.25)
Leverage -0.108 -0.236 0.100 0.149 -0.410 0.476 -0.362 -0.552
(-0.93) (-1.52) (0.95) (1.33) (-1.14) (1.13) (-1.01) (-1.55)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No No





Observations 1665 1461 1641 1606 163 163 163 147
R-squared 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.51 0.70 0.50 0.54










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Centrality -0.545 *** -0.470 *** -0.564 *** -0.515 *** -0.401 ** -0.382 ** -0.392 ** -0.402 **
(-3.685) (-3.165) (-3.776) (-3.413) (-2.364) (-2.213) (-2.406) (-2.353)
Cross-shareholdings -0.051 -0.050 -0.052 -0.051 -0.043 -0.043 -0.042 -0.043
(-1.585) (-1.553) (-1.587) (-1.546) (-1.035) (-1.037) (-0.997) (-1.034)
Firm age -4.302 *** -4.354 *** -4.350 *** -4.357 *** -4.614 *** -4.644 *** -4.568 *** -4.607 ***
(-3.700) (-3.744) (-3.672) (-3.722) (-3.345) (-3.385) (-3.239) (-3.334)
Size 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 0.089 *** 0.089 *** 0.091 *** 0.091 *** 0.091 *** 0.091 ***
(6.464) (5.902) (6.485) (6.467) (5.368) (5.320) (5.346) (5.332)
Stand-alone ROA 0.077 0.087 0.077 0.076 0.188 0.189 0.187 0.189
(0.315) (0.346) (0.315) (0.310) (0.830) (0.827) (0.825) (0.831)
Capex 0.432 * 0.442 * 0.428 * 0.419 * 0.331 0.332 0.330 0.331
(1.942) (1.971) (1.926) (1.892) (1.568) (1.571) (1.565) (1.571)
Leverage 0.052 0.050 0.058 0.058 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.382) (0.370) (0.426) (0.429) (0.021) (0.017) (0.006) (0.019)
Ultimate ownership -0.111 -0.061
(-1.169) (-0.436)
Separation VR -0.069 0.031
(-0.813) (0.346)
Separation CC -0.214 * 0.014
(-1.894) (0.117)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807
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